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Italy’s prime minister, Matteo Renzi, has voiced criticism of EU decision-making in recent months in
relation to both the migration crisis and ﬁscal policy rules. Lorenzo Piccoli writes that although
Renzi’s European policy is partly rooted in seeing oﬀ the challenge of Eurosceptic parties within
Italy, he is also intent on playing a more assertive role at the European level as a counterweight to
German inﬂuence.
In the last few months, Matteo Renzi has voiced intense criticism of how the European Union is
currently run. In December, the Italian prime minister attacked the German Chancellor Angela
Merkel for her failure to go along with a joint deposit insurance scheme. Then, again, in February he lambasted the
German decision not to go ahead with the expansion of a northern gas pipeline from Russia.
Meanwhile, he has also started a scrap with Jean-Claude Juncker for resisting Italy’s request to temporarily exceed
deﬁcit-to-GDP ratios in order to push through structural reforms and deal with the refugee crisis. In a letter published
in the Guardian earlier this year, Renzi wrote that “Europe isn’t working for this generation”. Many pundits fear that
this behaviour is a populist reaction to Italians’ growing disillusionment with the European project. The prime
minister’s strategy, however, must be understood as part of a more complex political game.
Italy and Europe
Italy’s discontent with Europe is a relatively new phenomenon. In the aftermath of the Second World War, the
country’s hopes for peace and prosperity prompted an optimistic embrace of European values. Italian post-war
leaders signed the country up as one of the founding members of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC)
in 1951 and the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957.
Italy’s strong commitment to the ECSC and the EEC was deﬁned by the understanding that a united Europe was a
panacea for the country’s economic, social, and political instability. Subsequent Italian representatives proudly
defended the European destiny of the country: it was well understood, among Italian political elites, that the country
had to be European.
The decision to join the euro was a deﬁning moment for this narrative. It came at the beginning of the 1990s,
following two decades of unsustainable expansionary policies designed to placate the social unrest of the 1960s and
1970s with inﬂation. When foreign investors began to acquire increasing shares of public debt, in the mid-1980s,
they unleashed speculation against the Italian currency, the lira, causing its sharp devaluation.
The peak of the crisis was 1992, when the political system known as the First Republic imploded after a series of
corruption scandals. At the time, the abandoning of the lira and the diﬃcult path to the euro coincided with the
construction of a national imperative: (ri)entrare in Europa. In a widely cited paper, Kenneth Dyson and Kevin
Featherstone argued that the ‘vincolo esterno’ of the European Monetary Union (EMU) had a profound impact on the
country’s political preferences: the less Italians trusted their own leaders and their own currency, the more they
approved of the transfer of important responsibilities upward toward Brussels.
The annual Eurobarometer surveys conﬁrmed that Italians enthusiastically endorsed being part of a supranational
political and economic organisation: in the 1990s, the country consistently scored some of the highest levels of trust
in the EU. It was a conﬁrmation that Italians had embraced their European destiny: the country was certainly
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important for Europe, but Europe was even more
important for Italy.
As it turns out, the adoption of the new currency
helped foster a general loss of enthusiasm for this
European destiny. This occurred ﬁrst in the early
2000s, when the lira was replaced by the euro and
prices rose sharply. And then around 2008, when
Italy fell into the recession and the euro was blamed
for its rigidity.
Although the lira may have brought double-digit
inﬂation, its continuous devaluations supported the
country’s exports and helped the government repay
its debts. Indeed, it is widely acknowledged that
Italy’s economic weaknesses predate the adoption of
the euro; but it is the new currency that exposed the
unsustainability of high debt, low growth and an
ineﬃcient public sector in the context of austere and
rigid European policies.
In the last few years, more and more Italians have cultivated a sense of betrayal: they expected that sharing a
European currency would boost their living standards and instead they have found themselves in a triple-dip
recession. The Eurobarometer surveys conﬁrm this shift of opinions: in 2006 only 32% of Italians felt very limited or
no attachment to the EU; in 2014 the numbers have grown to 57%.
The rise of Italian Euroscepticism
Political entrepreneurs have sought to capitalise on this dissatisfaction. In the last election in 2013, anti-euro
sentiment was fuelled by the success of Beppe Grillo’s Five Star Movement, which gained 25% of the vote in part
due to its proposal for a referendum to be held on whether to stay in the euro or not. In the same political campaign,
former prime minister Silvio Berlusconi’s vigorous attacks against German austerity policies helped him to a
surprising electoral comeback. The success of these parties forced Renzi’s Democratic Party into an uneasy alliance
with some of Italy’s conservative forces.
Indeed, pressure from Eurosceptic competitors is one of the factors underpinning Renzi’s recent critical stance
against the current state of aﬀairs in Brussels. In an interview with the Financial Times the day after elections in
Spain resulted in prime minister Mariano Rajoy losing his parliamentary majority, he stated that: “I don’t know what’s
going to happen to my friend Mariano, but I know that those who have been in the front line of being the faithful allies
of the politics of rigor without growth have lost their jobs.”
Several political analysts have reasoned that Renzi’s European quarrels are essentially an external dimension of his
domestic political strategy. But this is only part of the picture because it does not take into account the other game
Matteo Renzi is playing on the European table. In Brussels the Italian prime minister has repeatedly claimed that
Europe remains the solution to many Italian vices. And he has been keen to demonstrate his commitment,
sometimes with highly symbolic gestures.
The day after a tense meeting with Angela Merkel in January, for instance, Renzi took a helicopter ride across the
Tyrrhenian Sea to visit the tiny islands of Ventotene and Santo Stefano and lay ﬂowers at the tomb of Altiero Spinelli,
the famous Italian anti-fascist who co-authored the “Ventotene manifesto” for a federal Europe. Renzi then visited a
former prison on Santo Stefano which is to be transformed into a school for future leaders of the EU thanks to €80m
in funding from Rome.
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It was a deeply symbolic move for the prime minister. But there is more to this than mere symbolism. There are, in
fact, several concrete reasons why Renzi wishes to signal a more assertive Italian stance towards Brussels: with a
debt-to-GDP ratio of 132.5 percent, his ﬁscal ﬂexibility is limited, and he feels unable to raise taxes because, as he
admitted with disarming candour in a recent conference at Harvard University, “the people will kill us – and the
people are correct.” His argument is that Italy cannot cope with the current economic model if it is not allowed more
room for manoeuvre; and his goal is to make the EU more ﬂexible to this end.
Renzi’s European strategy
This objective must be understood in the context of a rapidly changing approach in Brussels. Renzi has a strong
hand to play, mainly because of the landslide victory of his party at the 2014 European elections, which left the
Democratic Party with the second biggest delegation in the European Parliament only after Merkel’s CDU/CSU. This
represents considerable political capital at a moment when, crucially, European institutions are becoming more
politicised.
With the election of the Juncker Commission, the traditional civil servant sitting in the Berlaymont has been
transformed into what Sergio Fabbrini calls “a political operator”, someone who follows a partisan agenda rather
than simply implementing technocratic policies. This transformation of the President of the Commission changes the
nature of its relationship with national government leaders: as the Commission becomes politicised, governments
will have to respond in kind. And in this increasingly political environment, where can a Europe disillusioned with
German leadership turn?
Britain has voluntarily excluded itself, Spain cannot even form a government, and France’s external politics are
undermined by the weakness of President François Hollande. This vacuum leaves the Italian government as the
main counterweight to Germany, a country that has eﬀectively translated its national interests into a broader
European mission. While Harold Macmillan could once remark of Charles de Gaulle that ‘he talks of Europe and
means France’, the same sentiment is now privately expressed by European leaders concerning Angela Merkel.
And she, just like her Italian counterpart, is conditioned by her country’s internal politics. If Renzi needs to revive
growth to counter populist waves, Merkel needs quick solutions for handling the large numbers of refugees that have
arrived in Germany during the current crisis. In the end, both leaders are concerned with the proper functioning of
the EU institutions; but they have substantially divergent views on the tasks that these institutions should undertake.
One should not forget that Renzi and Merkel have diametrically opposed experiences concerning the impact of
European uniﬁcation on the destiny of their country. The chancellor was raised in highly deprived East Germany
during the Cold War, abiding by the dictum “don’t borrow, don’t spend.” The prime minister, by contrast, was raised
in a country where public spending created a patchwork quilt of employment and public subsidies. The one thing his
country has traditionally shared with Merkel’s Germany is the reality of a European divide. The problem is that today
they ﬁnd each other on the opposite shores of that divide.
And this might be a bit more of a problem for Italy than it is for Germany, mainly because in the past few years
Berlin has been able to inﬂuence Brussels much more than Rome. Italy has always been important to Europe, but
not necessarily inﬂuential. Now Renzi is trying to turn Italy’s European destiny into a speciﬁc mission: to make
Europe a little bit less German and a little bit more Italian.
In practice, Renzi and his ministers are making the case for ﬁscal stimulus, thus defying German and European
Commission demands to tighten national budgets. Playing an assertive resistance to German economic dogma
remains something of a gamble, with Italy precariously balanced between pro-austerity and anti-austerity forces.
But Renzi is used to playing this game at home, where he has nimbly zigzagged between left and right to
consolidate his position in power. It is impossible to predict whether he can do the same at the European level,
where more prudent strategies have traditionally been rewarded.
3/4
Please read our comments policy before commenting .
Note: This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and Policy, nor
of the London School of Economics.
Shortened URL for this post: http://bit.ly/1q7Gjah
 _________________________________
About the author
Lorenzo Piccoli – European University Institute
Lorenzo Piccoli is a researcher at the Department of Social and Political Sciences at the European
University Institute in Florence. He works on self-government and citizenship policies. He
collaborates with the Italian NGO Unimondo.
4/4
